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FOREWORD
Regime change during the Arab Spring allowed Islamist political forces that long had been marginalized
to achieve political influence in Tunisia, Egypt, and
Libya. Meanwhile, Morocco’s first government led
by an Islamist party has been in power since January
2012. This trend caused widespread concern over the
future direction of these states; but despite the tragic
example of Egypt, few negative predictions have yet
been borne out.
In this monograph, Dr. El-Katiri, a British analyst
with many years of experience in reporting on the
Middle East and North Africa, cautions against an
overly simplistic assessment of this rise in the influence and power of political Islam. He uses an extensive range of source material to show that the political
crises besetting each of these Islamist governments
are not necessarily of their own making, but instead
are determined by objective circumstances. He also
describes how in several key respects the aims of Islamist parties are in line with U.S. aspirations for
the region.
The Strategic Studies Institute recommends this
monograph to all readers studying and working with
North African states, as well as those interested in the
topic of political Islam more broadly.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
As part of the radical political changes that have
affected a number of Arab countries over the past 4
years, the toppling of regimes and the organization of
the first fair and free elections in several Arab states
have allowed Islamist parties to rise to power. This
highly visible political trend has caused mixed reactions, both within these countries and internationally.
Prior to the Arab Spring, most countries in the region
banned Islamist movements from forming political
parties. For decades, members of such movements
were jailed, tortured, and exiled from their home
countries. Even in those states where Islamist political
parties were allowed, they had limited freedom and
were under the scrutiny of the regimes, as was, for example, the Moroccan Justice and Development Party.
The varied experiences of Islamist political parties
in power over the last 2 years in Tunisia, Morocco, and
Egypt offer a mixed picture. The debacle of Muslim
Brotherhood rule in Egypt captured a great deal of international attention, but it did not resemble the trajectory of other governing Islamist parties in the region.
Electorates have been disappointed by the performance of Islamist-led governments, which turned out
to be unprepared to govern. Their poor performance
is not only due to a lack of capability; it is also due
to the fact that integration into the existing political
system has not been smooth and free of obstruction.
Islamist parties have faced fierce resistance both from
secular parties and other forces in their respective societies and from abroad, as is evident from the opposition of rich Arab Gulf Monarchies.
Completed in 2013, this monograph does not include the most recent political developments in all
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of the three countries under discussion, but it establishes a number of important and persistent themes.
It provides an overview of the factors behind the victory of Islamist parties in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, and continues by examining their performance
in power in different policy areas, with a particular
focus on foreign policy. It argues that policymakers should not follow the popular trend of reducing
the delicate political transition underway in Egypt,
Tunisia, and Morocco to simple ideological differences between Islamist parties and their secular opponents. Instead, this is a reflection of an ongoing
struggle between traditional elites. Furthermore, it
should be remembered that, contrary to widespread
fears, the foreign policy aims of Islamist political
parties in North Africa coincide with the aims of the
United States and its allies in a number of key areas.
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REVIVAL OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN THE
AFTERMATH OF THE ARAB UPRISINGS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGION
AND BEYOND
INTRODUCTION
The uprisings that have swept across the Arab
world since December 2010 have resulted in drastic
changes in the political landscape of several countries,
and brought new dynamics in intraregional relations.
The long-term political regimes first of Tunisia, then
Egypt, Libya, and later Yemen were ousted, and other Arab leaders were pressured to announce a set of
institutional and constitutional reforms. Subsequent
elections for new governments brought about sweeping victories for Islamic parties in both Tunisia and
Egypt, with Islamic protest movements crowding
the streets in many other Arab neighbors, including
Libya, Algeria, and Syria. Morocco’s first government
led by an Islamic party took office in January 2012, following increasingly large electoral successes at two
previous elections in the 2000s. These victories are no
small development for the Arab region; for the first
time in the modern history of these countries, Islamic
political parties are now ascending to power through
democratic elections.
Islamist groups do not have to win elections to
change the political landscape; the experiences of Algeria and Libya provide instructive examples. Against
the expectations of many observers, Islamists performed poorly in the 2012 elections in both countries,
but they continue to distort local politics. In Libya, a
victory by liberals does not mean the influence of Islamists in the political sphere has vanished. The Mus-
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lim Brotherhood-inspired Islamist group is shaping
the political and security situation in parliament and
the streets through its militias. In Algeria, the Islamist
parties were not victorious in the legislative elections
of May 2012, a result that surprised many observers
who predicted Algeria would follow in the footsteps
of its neighbors, Morocco and Tunisia. But Algeria’s
election results have generated much discussion
within Algerian political circles about the role of the
regime in manipulating the elections.1
Where Islamic governments are already in power
in the Islamic world, their troubles are not over. At the
time of this writing, the three elected Islamist governments in the region are each experiencing a political
crisis that has either suspended their rule or threatens
their coalitions. In Egypt, the Egyptian military ousted
President Mohammed Morsi in July 2013 and arrested
several of his ministers and leaders of the Muslim
Brotherhood. In Tunisia and Morocco, both Islamistled governments are entangled in political crises that
may cause their coalition governments to fall apart.
The problems these governments face are not necessarily self-inflicted. Both in Egypt and in Tunisia,
and to some extent also in Morocco, Islamist parties
came to power at the most challenging political and
economic moment since these countries gained independence decades ago. They inherited precarious
and challenging economic situations, characterized by
widening budget deficits, soaring food prices, dwindling foreign reserves, and increased unemployment.
Facing these enormous challenges, the Arab world’s
Islamist parties share a common lack of governing experience, often tied to (1) their first time in office; (2)
their typically high focus on religious-ideological topics rather than core themes such as economic reform
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beyond broad welfarist rhetoric; and (3) in many cases
an election result that surprised their political leaders themselves. Simply put, they were not prepared
to govern.
Entirely separate from the old internecine ties that
in the past characterized Arab political regimes, the
Arab world’s Islamist parties lack the culture of bureaucratic clientelism that characterized the de facto
single-party systems in Tunisia and Egypt, and Morocco’s varying ruling coalitions of palace-trusted
parties since the 1960s. Being part of a larger coalition
has not helped these parties integrate particularly well
into their national political context; they seem, rather,
detached from these coalitions, neither learning from
more experienced coalition partners, nor being able to
put forward those supposed policies that were meant
to govern their own political programs. The apparent
outcome appears for the most part to be one of stalled
Islamist politics, that have produced few of the results
their supporters initially endorsed.
In this monograph, we endeavor not to give a survey of all political Islam-inspired groups in the Middle
East, but instead to focus on moderate Islamist parties
that are in power or (as was the case of Egypt) have led
coalition governments, and to review their behavior
and agenda in the current changing and challenging
circumstances of the Middle East and North Africa.
The monograph is primarily concerned with the performance of Islamist-led governments over the 2 years
to 2013, with particular focus on the approach to the
three countries’ foreign relations. Despite their various socio-economic, historical, and political realities,
and an ideological orientation that markedly set apart
the Islamist government of Morocco from those of Tunisia and Egypt, the three face a set of commonalities,
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including a complicated political backdrop and lack of
experience in running a government. For this analysis, we highlight common features that characterize
the time in power of all these governments, leading
to conclusions about the nature of political Islam as
a whole.
The first section of the monograph examines the
reasons behind the Islamist parties emerging as the
main political force in the first free and fair elections in
the history of the region. The second section outlines
the internal political and economic challenges faced
by these Islamist-led governments over the previous
2 years. Finally, the third section discusses the trajectory of the three countries’ foreign policies during the
Islamists’ rule.
FOUNDATIONS OF ISLAMIST ELECTORAL
SUCCESS
To gauge the importance of the moderate Islamists’
ascent to power, a brief history of their political experience is necessary. In contrast to many radical Islamic
groups that believed in and adopted violence as a way
to achieve political change, moderate Islamist movements adopted a more constructive attitude and role
in society. They rejected violence and accepted democratic rules as a way to compete for political power,
including as political parties. During the 1990s and
2000s, many of these groups, including the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, gradually turned into de
facto opposition movements, using human rights and
democratic rhetoric and the fight against systemic corruption in existing political cadres as an integral part
of their political programs.2 Throughout the years,
many of these groups managed to refine and mod-
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erate their political thinking and win more support
across society.
Morocco’s Party of Justice and Development (PJD),
Tunisia’s Ennahda movement, and Egypt’s Muslim
Brotherhood have since pragmatically moderated
their stances on several societal issues such as personal liberties, gender equality, and economic affairs. In
the Moroccan and Tunisian case, women have been a
critical element, both within those parties and as supporters and voters. The PJD party has promoted itself
as a very moderate Islamic party, dissipating fears
among some that the party could turn into another
Algerian Islamic Salvation Front; the party embraces
through its rhetoric human rights and the importance
of tourism, and has shied away from including views
about the consumption of alcohol in its program.
Within government, the party has focused on social
sector reform, rather than on ministries traditionally
held and managed by the King or one of his allied parties, such as the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry
of Islamic Affairs.
The bloody outcome of the Arab world’s first electoral victory of an Islamic party, the Islamic Salvation
Front (FIS) in Algeria in 1991, nevertheless served as
a first warning to those who seemed to believe that
the future of the Middle East could be assured under
Islamic-democratic governments. The victory of FIS
in the first round of elections led to the military moving in to cancel the second round in December 1991,
which led to the outbreak of a decade-long civil war
and is estimated to have cost 200,000 lives. Although
the Islamist movements were an influential political
force, their political participation thereafter was restrained. The Islamist movements were not allowed to
form political parties and participate formally in elec-
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tions, and so, in most countries, members of Islamist
movements would run for elections as independents.
Nevertheless, Islamic parties’ discourses and activities constituted a serious challenge to the stability
and continuity of political regimes in power in their
respective countries. The Arab regimes observed with
great concern the rise of Islamist movements, and
used a range of measures to curb their progress and
popularity among the public. Experiences varied from
one country to another, but Islamists were prohibited
from participating in political institutions as political
parties for years and saw their members jailed, killed,
or exiled. Even when Islamists were allowed to form
a civil, not religious, political party, as was the case
of PJD in Morocco,3 they were deeply mistrusted and
continuously scrutinized. The regimes used all communication tools and means to limit the moderate Islamists’ appeal to the public. In Morocco, the rise to
prominence of any Islamic movement is perceived as
a challenge to exclusive prerogatives of the King. The
Moroccan monarch, as Commander of the Faithful, is
the supreme religious authority in the country. This
spiritual position constitutes an important element
of the monarch’s legitimacy as a descendent of the
prophet Mohammed. The Islamic movement in Tunisia suffered from oppression and persecutions for
decades under Ben Ali’s regime. Tunisian authorities
rejected applications by Islamist movements to constitute a political party and participate in political life
as an organization. Following the 1989 elections, most
Ennahda leaders left the country to seek refuge in different countries around the world. Zine El Abidine
Ben Ali’s regime saw in the Islamists a threat to secularism and the interests of the ruling class.4
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The experience in Egypt was not much different.
The Muslim Brotherhood leadership and members
were intimidated and harassed by the ruling party and
security agencies.5 Influential members of the Brotherhood organization were routinely arrested and sentenced to jail.6 After they were outlawed in 1954 during Gamal Abdel Nasser’s rule, Muslim Brotherhood
members were banned from constituting a political
party. They were only allowed to participate in legislative or local elections as independent candidates
during Mubarak’s rule, but with a tacit agreement that
they should present a limited number of independent
candidates.
The post-revolution era saw a change of approach
toward the Islamist movements’ aspirations to participate in the political system. Several political parties have been legalized in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia.
In Egypt, the Al-Nour party, representing the Salafi
movement, was legalized in June 2011 by the Political
Parties Affairs Commission,7 and became the second
most important political party in the country. In the
same period, the Muslim Brotherhood received a favorable response to its demand to establish the Freedom and Justice Party. Post-Qadhafi Libya saw the
burgeoning of political parties after revoking a law introduced by Qadhafi in the 1970s that banned political
parties, including the Islamist Justice and Construction party and Al-Umma al-Wasat party. Another
movement that came to prominence in revolution-affected countries is the Salafi groups in Tunisia, Egypt,
and Morocco.
It is only with this background in mind that one can
understand the momentousness of the change in the
Arab political landscape. But the question remains of
how the Islamists garnered all the support they need-
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ed for landslide victories. The triumph of Islamists in
elections can be attributed to two main factors. First,
the popularity of these parties is mainly accredited to
the fact that millions of Arabs see in Islamist politicians an answer to their socio-economic expectations.
High rates of unemployment, soaring living costs, and
regional and social income disparities were some of
the fundamental factors that sparked protests and revolutions across the region since December 2010.8 These
were the kind of issues that Islamist movements have
striven to address. Moderate Islamist groups capitalized on all the failures and shortcomings of previous
governments in order to build their political discourse.
The Islamist parties campaigned to fight corruption and bring fair distribution of wealth; they have
opposed regimes’ oppressive and undemocratic practices; they called for respect for human rights and the
need to introduce democratic reforms and good governance; in many cases, they strengthened their credibility by matching their words with actions, by building schools and hospitals, and by collecting money for
various social causes. For years, Islamic movements
in all countries played an important role in providing
services that the state failed to provide to economically and socially marginalized social groups. The
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, for instance, ran charitable organizations, schools, hospitals, and housing
cooperatives for millions of Egyptians.9 It provided
loans to start businesses for entrepreneurs. This made
the movements very popular among many disenfranchised social groups and political idealists (educated
groups that dreamed of a well-functioning, fair, and
democratic nation) in Arab societies. Moreover, both
membership and the constituency of Islamist parties
differs significantly from that of other established par-
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ties: these are not based on family, tribal, ethnic, or
other long-term established clientelist ties, but rather
on a shared belief. In Morocco, Egypt, and Tunisia,
where few sectarian minorities exist, the popular
feeling of “we,” versus the old-established system of
“them” ruling “us,” is perhaps best captured by the
Islamist movements—a factor explaining the mass
appeal of these movements.
Second, the collapse of the dominant ruling parties in Egypt and Tunisia—the National Democratic
Party and Rassemblement Constitutionnele Democratique
(RCD), alongside their long-term presidents, Hosni
Mubarak and Zineddine Ben Ali, respectively—left a
vacuum in the political scene. Having dominated political life in its entirety for decades, these parties left
few other options in the political playing field. With
both systemic and popular pressure for a quick handover of power via new elections, little time was available for the development of political culture and parties, leaving the field open to those social trends with
the most established support—which, under these
totalitarian regimes, were the primary socially active
Islamic networks. Other opposition parties were small
and weak. Their failure to win large public support
has been ascribed to several factors, chief among them
being weak leadership, lack of internal democracy
and detachment from the masses’ demands and aspirations.10 Often including former members of the ousted regimes, they were perceived as regime-endorsed
parties lacking any genuine interest in bringing about
political and economic changes. On the contrary, the
moderate Islamists managed to gain the reputation of
being genuine in their opposition to the regime and
calls for rotation of power—many of them had themselves been harassed and imprisoned for many years
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and therefore held credibility in their aspiration for
change. In Morocco, a country that was not so much
affected by the popular upheavals, the traditional leftist political parties lost their popular political appeal
after their poor performance in previous governments
since the 1990s.
Political Islam emerged as the main winner of the
popular upheavals and revolutions that swept the
Arab world since December 2010, despite the fact that
the Islamist movement had no leadership role in the
instigation of popular protests. The triumph of Islamist parties has been a historical turning point in the
political history of these Arab countries. It might not
have been entirely surprising for countries like Egypt
and Morocco, where Islamists had large constituencies
and a history of participation in the political life, but
their victory in Tunisia was unexpected and surprised
Tunisian political and civil society as well as the outside world. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood had
been the only challenging force to the ruling National
Democratic Party (NDP) in parliamentary elections
since 2000. In 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood, through
its members presenting as independent candidates,
won 88 seats in the Egyptian parliament despite still
at that point being a banned organization.11
Alarmed by the rise of this movement, the Egyptian regime responded with the adoption of a set of
measures to restrain the Islamist organization’s role in
the political institutions.12 Measures employed by the
Egyptian regime included arrests of Muslim Brotherhood members, including some of its leading figures,
and closures of businesses owned by Muslim Brotherhood members. These measures, coupled with manipulation of votes and voters, resulted in dramatic
losses of Muslim Brotherhood candidates in the 2010
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parliamentary elections, and a landslide victory for the
NDP. Meanwhile in Morocco, PJD had been licensed
as political party since the mid-1990s, participating
actively in Moroccan political life since then. Over the
next 2 decades, PJD strengthened its position in the
Moroccan political scene, and the number of parliament seats won by its candidates grew steadily since
its first participation in general elections in 1997.
THE END OF THE HONEYMOON:
THE MANY CHALLENGES FACING
THE ISLAMIST GOVERNMENTS
Translating the initial momentum of electoral support into real policy change in the region has not been
an easy task for the elected Islamists. The Islamist-led
governments had to deal with many urgent issues,
chief among them inherited socio-economic problems
that had been much exacerbated in Tunisia and Egypt
by months of political upheaval, legal and economic
uncertainty, and a national security service at high political alert. Moreover, as newcomers to the political
system, Islamist parties have generally faced the challenge of how to integrate and function on a political
level surrounded by the remnants of the old regimes
which are still very much present. The revolutions in
Egypt and Tunisia deposed key figures of the political systems but did not remove the bureaucracy and,
most importantly, did not eradicate old mindsets. The
old regime was composed of security officers, bureaucrats, judiciary officials, and businessmen that had
vested interests in the continuity and the stability of
the system. In Morocco, many parts of the bureaucracy, including ministerial staff, are the predominant
clients of the Makhzen, the ruling establishment made
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up of the King and his supporters, including Palacesupported political parties. In this context, it becomes
less surprising that Islamist politics have not yet found
an effective path forward.
Integrating New Parties into Old Political
Structures.
The rise to prominence of Islamist parties in several Arab countries was not welcomed by all segments
of Arab societies and ruling regimes. For instance, the
elected Islamists encountered stiff resistance from the
bureaucratic apparatus. Several bureaucratic elites,
who in theory are supposed to be politically neutral,
showed strong antipathy toward the Islamists and
their reform agenda. Several instances of tensions
have emerged between Islamists and civil service institutions. Bureaucrats have blocked or delayed procedures or were not responsive to the governmental
initiatives. Senior technocrats appointed by the former regimes in Egypt and Tunisia, or by the King in
Morocco, have aligned their forces with leftist parties,
secularism proponents, and economic elites in order
to oppose the Islamists. The power struggle between
the judiciary and Egypt’s Morsi on several reform
projects is an illustration of the difficulties the Islamist
rulers have faced.13
It should be noted that the opposition of bureaucracy cadres was not only ideologically driven, but in
most cases is a struggle to maintain power, privileges,
and economic interests. Many proponents of Islam
from the regimes are socially conservative, but still
would not support an Islamist reform agenda. Morocco is the best example where many influential families that make up the Makhzen are conservative, and
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adherence to Islamic values and traditions constitutes
a significant part of their social prestige. Nevertheless, they are still considered opponents of PJD and its
socio-economic reform agenda. In sum, bureaucratic
opposition is not oriented solely against Islamists but
against any political formation that could endanger
existing socio-economic entitlements.
This resistance was expected. Most technocrats
were part of a culture that perceived Islam-inspired
political movements as an existential threat to the regimes of which they were a part. These technocrats
played an important role in government strategies to
manage the phenomenon of political Islam. Responses
by previous regimes ranged from repression to co-option approaches, from persecuting and jailing the Islamist militants and activists to allowing them to run
for elections. Unlike Libya, where the post-revolution
government adopted a vetting law that affected officers and officials from across the state bureaucracy,
Tunisia and Egypt have taken a different course. In
Tunisia, the draft “law for the protection of the revolution” is not as broad as the Libyan one. Vetting has
been limited to senior political figures who served in
Ben Ali’s government or the dissolved Constitutional
Democratic Rally (CDR).14
The Islamist-led coalition governments in Tunisia
and Morocco have gone through episodes of tensions
between Islamist parties on one hand, and their government partners and opposition parties on the other.15 This is more pronounced in the case of Tunisia,
where secular resistance to the Islamist government
triggered social unrest and political revolt for months
in Tunisian cities, and plunged the country into political uncertainty. Residents of Sidi Bouzid, a town
where the revolution began in December 2010, took

13

to the streets on several occasions to protest against
the failure of the Islamist-led government to tackle
their socio-economic grievances. Some of these protests lead to violent confrontations with police forces,
as was the case in August 2012.16 Similar violent protests happened in other peripheral cities such as the
protests in Siliana in November 2012.17 The protests
were not only confined to the peripheral cities, but
have also affected the capital Tunis that experienced
several riots and strikes. In June 2012, the Tunisian
government imposed an overnight curfew following
violent protests by Salafists over an art exhibition that
was deemed disrespectful of Islamic morality.18
The difficult political transition almost fractured
the Ennahda party in February 2013. Islamist Prime
Minister Hamadi Jebali proposed without any consultation with his party a plan to form an apolitical government. This attempt to appease the political tensions
and polarization of Tunisian society was worsened
further by the assassination of leftist political leader
Chokri Belaid, and ensuing violent protests. The solution did not win political support within Ennahda and
was fiercely rejected by several key members of the
party, including its leader, Rachid Ghannoushi, on the
basis of concerns regarding the image and credibility
of the party in front of its voters.
Following his failure to form a government of
technocrats, Jebali resigned from his position.19 A new
cabinet was formed where important ministerial portfolios, such as defense, interior, and justice, went to
technocrats. These political concessions did not win
Ennahda peace. Unsatisfied about limited political
power to shape the new political order in the post-Ben
Ali era, the secular opposition parties have constantly
criticized the performance of the Ennahda-led govern-
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ment. Secular critics have accused Ennahda of adopting a lax attitude toward increasing Salafi violence,
and of having a hidden counterdemocratic agenda.
These accusations and counteraccusations between
the two political blocs have polarized Tunisian society still further. In the view of Tunisian intellectuals,
this emerging schism poses the main security threat to
Tunisian society, and could push the country to chaos.20 After months of political standstill, the Ennahda
party has at the time of this writing still not reached an
agreement with the secular opposition parties to end
their political differences and agree on a political road
map.21 The opposition parties are calling for the dissolution of the current government and the holding of
new elections.
Morocco remained relatively stable compared to
Egypt and Tunisia. The country did not experience
mass violence, and most demonstrations were peaceful. However, the government still went through continuous political crises. At the time of this writing,
the PJD-led government is on the brink of collapse.
Since its election victory in 2011, PJD’s ministers and
decisions had received continuous criticism from
opposition parties, in particular from its ideological rival, the Authenticity and Modernity Party. This
group is regarded by many observers as the Palace’s
party, and one of its fundamental missions since its
establishment in 2008 has been to limit the political
dominance of Islamist movements. The antagonism
toward the PJD ministers was not limited to its opposition rivals but came also from within its coalition
partners. The PJD-led government became a minority
government following the withdrawal of one of its important coalition partners, the Istiqlal Party, in June
2013. The PJD had no other options than to approach
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one of its opposition rivals, the National Rally of Independents, to negotiate the terms of their participation
in the government.22 The Moroccan electoral system
does not allow any party to win a clear majority and
govern alone.
Islamists also have external opponents. Several
countries have seen in the rise of Islamist parties a direct threat to their strategic interests. At the regional
level, the Gulf monarchies saw in the election of the
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt a threat to their own national stability and interests in the region. Historically,
Egyptian Muslim Brothers have had an influence on
their offshoots across the Arab world, including in the
Gulf countries. The Gulf rulers were concerned that
these ties could be exploited to challenge their authority. United Arab Emirates (UAE) Foreign Minister,
Abdullah bin Zayed, openly expressed these concerns,
saying that:
The Muslim Brotherhood does not believe in the nation state. It does not believe in the sovereignty of
the state. There were individuals within the Muslim
Brotherhood who would be able to use their prestige
and capabilities to violate the sovereignty, laws and
rules of other countries.23

Based on these assumptions, Gulf regimes, led by
Saudi Arabia and the UAE, worked actively to restrain
the political success of the Muslim Brotherhood during the period of Morsi’s rule. Gulf countries, other
than Qatar, froze their financial aid to Egypt in order
to accentuate the failure of the Islamists. It is revealing that both Saudi Arabia and the UAE announced
$8 billion in aid to tackle Egypt’s immediate financial and economic problems directly after the ousting
of Morsi.24 The timing of the Gulf rulers’ generosity
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was aimed to send a strong signal to Egyptian voters
that voting against the Muslim Brotherhood brings
prosperity.25
Beyond the Arab world, a statement by French
Minister of the Interior Manuel Valls illustrates such
fears. He remarked that:
There is an Islamic fascism rising everywhere, but this
obscurantism must, of course, be condemned because
it denies the democracy for which the Libyan, Tunisian and Egyptian people have fought… it is a considerable issue… not only for Tunisians but for the whole
Mediterranean space and thus for France.26

Ideological Opposition of Secularists and
Religious Minorities.
This change in the political balance has alarmed religious and political forces and minorities, particularly
secularist parties, which saw in these developments
a potential threat to liberal and modern values and,
most importantly, to their privileges. These concerns
are not new.
Liberals and secularists have a history of resentment against Islamists in the Arab world. The victory
of Islamists in several Arab countries revived old disagreements and rivalry between Islamists and secularists. The general concern of the liberal and secularist groups is the future of civil liberties and freedoms.
For instance, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood after
the 2005 parliamentary elections worried Copts and
leftists in Egypt because of the potential influence that
the Brotherhood could exercise on legislation. The
vagueness of the Muslim Brotherhood’s societal project remains the primary contributor to the worries of
Egyptian minorities and liberals. The long-standing
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slogan, “Islam is the solution,” used by the Muslim
Brothers in many parliamentary elections is confusing
and adds to the anxiety of the proponents of a civil
state. In effect, the Muslim Brotherhood has failed to
explain how exactly Islam will provide solutions to
Egypt’s problems. A comment by a Coptic intellectual published in the Egyptian newspaper, Al-Ahram,
captures the worries of his community once the Muslim Brotherhood is in power, “rich Copts will leave
the country while the poor Copts will stay . . . maybe
some of them will be converted . . . I hope I die before
this happens.”27
The return of sectarian strife across different Egyptian regions since the ousting of Mubarak has reinforced worries among Copts. Although the Muslim
Brotherhood apparently did not incite its members
to attack Copts, the involvement of Islamists in attacks against Copts or justification of such clashes on
a religious basis have only entrenched the idea that
Islamists are a threat to the Copts.
The ongoing political discussion in post-revolution
Egypt on the role of Islam as a source of legislation is
another important illustration of the divide between
the two groups. Attempts by Egyptian and Tunisian
Islamists in constituent assemblies to give Islam and
Islamic law an important position in the constitutions
draw strong opposition from secularist groups and
parties that advocate a separation between religion
and politics.
During the electoral campaigns, most Islamist
public figures in Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt were
pushed, by inflammatory media articles and protests,
to reassure the public about their adherence to democratic rules, and respect for human rights and personal liberties as well as a free market. They had to
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clarify their positions to local public and international
observers on different issues including tourism, consumption of alcohol, the role of women in society, and
that it is not their intention to impose a way of life or
make people more religious. In an article published in
the British newspaper, The Guardian, Tunisia’s Rachid
Ghannouchi wrote that:
We have long advocated democracy within the mainstream trend of political Islam, which we feel is the
best system that protects against injustice and authoritarianism. In addition, it provides institutions and
mechanisms to guarantee personal and public liberties . . . protection of the rights of women, separation
of powers, independence of the judiciary, press and
media freedom and protection of minority rights. All
these are in no way contradictory with Islam, but reflect the Islamic principles of consultation, justice and
accountability as we understand them.28

The worries of secularists and non-Muslim minorities might appear exaggerated. But there are precedents in Gaza and Iran, where Islamist governments
adopted a range of policy initiatives to “moralize”
their respective societies.29 The mistrust runs so deep
between the two groups that attempts by Islamist leaders in Morocco and Tunisia to display moderation and
pragmatism in their political and societal plans have
only brought limited success. Originally, this schism
was an ideological disagreement limited to intellectuals, but secularism has come to serve as a symbol of
protection of the interests of the political and economic elites, including figures from the old regimes in the
case of Tunisia and Egypt.
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Insufficient Institutional Capability.
Elected governments in Tunisia and Egypt inherited a murky economic situation following the revolutions in January 2011. The price of the revolutions was
economic recession, increased unemployment, and severe imbalances in public finances. Political instability
and uncertainty have severely affected the functioning of key economic sectors in both countries. For example, continuous strikes and social unrest have hampered phosphate production in Ghafsa, Tunisia, and
phosphate accounts for 7 percent of Tunisian gross
domestic product (GDP). In 2012, the Compagnie des
Phosphates de Ghafsa lost 60 percent of its production compared to previous years.30 Tourist arrivals in
both countries have, unsurprisingly, dropped significantly over the last 3 years, and have failed to return
to pre-revolution levels. Both countries have lost their
attractiveness to foreign investors. Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) have dropped considerably.31
Thus, it is not surprising that addressing economic
challenges featured in political discourses and government decisions as the first priority of the Islamist-led
governments in the region. Their focus started with
restoring macroeconomic stability, but since then has
not moved on from this approach. Their reforms were
not aimed at solving structural economic issues such
as unemployment, inflation, and stimulating economic growth, but rather focused on tackling fiscal stability and foreign reserves. They lacked a comprehensive
plan to deal with the difficult economic challenges of
their respective societies. With no exception, all the
Islamist-led governments have failed to come up with
comprehensive and sustainable policy initiatives to
stimulate economic growth, create jobs, and attract in-
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vestments. The Islamist-led governments were mainly
in a reactive rather than a proactive mode.
It is not only foreign investors that were deterred by
social and political tensions and uncertainty, but also
local investors. Consumer and business confidence
have been considerably weakened since the eruption
of protests and upheavals in Tunisia and Egypt. Political and legal uncertainties remain the key factors
that are discouraging domestic investors to invest
their capital in the local economy. For households, it
is uncertainty about their jobs and continuity of their
income that limits their consumption behavior.
Some government decisions have further contributed to business community worries. For instance,
judicial investigations on corruption cases involving
businesses linked to the ousted Ben Ali clan have not
finished, and they are maintaining a high state of anxiety among the Tunisian business community. Hundreds of Tunisian businessmen are banned from travelling abroad.32 The decision of the Egyptian Islamist
government to launch a tax-evasion investigation
against one of the most influential business families,
the Sawiris, was a strategic error and a shortsighted
decision. The case ended with a financial settlement33
but did not erase the concerns of the Egyptian business community about the future steps of the government. The community saw in this case a precedent that
could be further pursued by the government against
many crony-capitalists from the Mubarak era.
Another initiative that has alarmed both the secular and traditional business community was the
launch of the Egyptian Business Development Association by the Muslim Brotherhood’s business elites.
The most important rationale for the new business association was to counter the influence of the existing
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powerful Mubarak-linked businessmen, and provide
the government with ideas for its economic policy
decisions. The establishment of this new business association that mainly groups business owners who are
sympathetic with Islamist political goals and ideals,
was perceived by Egyptian economic elites as a signal
of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ambitions to replicate
the strategy of the governing Turkish Islamist party,
the Justice and Development Party (AKP), in challenging their economic interests and political power.34 The
“Islamic Bourgeoisie,” referring to the Anatolian entrepreneurs, is considered the backbone of the AKP’s
economic and political success.35
In Egypt, the Islamist government encountered difficulties in its negotiations with international financial
institutions to get loans for its development projects.
Lack of agreement after onerous and lengthy negotiations between the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the Egyptian government has negatively impacted the Egyptian economy, particularly its credit rating
in international markets. Disagreement on IMF conditionality for a $4.8 billion loan sends alarming messages
about the future growth and macroeconomic stability
of Egypt. IMF economic adjustment requirements to
add new taxes and reduce spending on subsidies have
been regarded by the Egyptian government as not the
most sensible approach given post-revolution political and economic conditions. The Egyptian authorities
do not disagree on the need for reform to bring more
efficiency in the way fuel and food subsidies are spent,
but they object to the timing with which these reforms
should be implemented. The Egyptian government
judges immediate implementation to be inappropriate given the country’s political climate and people’s
expectations.
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Over and above the technical details, political divisions and instability have complicated the negotiation of a financial loan deal. The IMF has required a
consensus among key political forces on the reform
program in the country in order to ensure its application over the coming years, which has been impossible to achieve given the severe political disagreement
among different political forces in the government
and opposition.
The Islamist movements were caught off guard by
the unexpected change of the political scene in their
respective countries, as was any other political force
in the region and international community as a whole.
The Islamist movements were simply not ready to rule.
This is understandable in the case of the Ennahda in
Tunisia, relatively new to political participation. But
the cases of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and,
more importantly, the Moroccan PJD evidence a failure to prepare to govern. Both organizations had been
very active in local politics for decades. For instance,
PJD had been established as a political party for almost 20 years, had participated in a number of legislative and local elections, and played a leading role in
the parliamentary opposition. But it had invested little
in preparing to govern the country.
The economic challenges that Egypt, Morocco,
and Tunisia are currently experiencing, with varying degrees of severity, are another symptom of the
unpreparedness of the Islamists to govern. Socioeconomic indicators have deteriorated.36 The main
reason is the lack of business experience and expertise of the Islamist leaders and among their cadres.
The second reason is more political in nature. The
Islamists lacked the political instinct to counter the
maneuvering of their opponents from the traditional
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economic and political elites and their established
patronage network that extended into the public
administration.
The problems of Islamist movements have not been
lack of knowledgeable individuals on economic affairs, but rather lack of institutions and teams that are
able to develop strategies for key sectors and implement them. Some of these individuals had theoretical
knowledge that was not accompanied with practical
expertise to bring real change on the ground. For instance, Ridha Saidi, Ennahda’s leading economist, had
showed an understanding of the needs of some of the
country’s strategic economic sectors during the electoral campaign in 2011, such as the tourism sector, and
promised several steps to revitalize the industry.37 The
suggested solutions were a series of generic common
sense measures, which did not reflect any innovative
thinking to present a tailor-made solution that tackled
the structural problems of the sector or recognize the
ongoing political instability and lack of security.
What all the Islamist parties that achieved power
have lacked is the support of an advisory group of
experts that are able to provide policy-oriented advice and prepare initiatives to the government. The
Islamists relied entirely on the technocrats in the
bureaucracy to develop new initiatives to present to
the government for endorsement and implementation. This has been a naïve assumption and a tactical mistake. The governing Islamist leadership did
not take into consideration the lack of capacity—
and willingness—of the executive cadres to provide
such solutions.
Although socio-economic reforms were at the
center of their demands and concerns, Islamist parties never developed alternative policies or thinking
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to achieve economic growth and improve economic
conditions for the majority. This structural dearth of
governing experience and policy implementation capability was evident in the electoral campaigns. The
Islamist parties’ manifestos lacked any detailed economic sections on how to deal with the economic challenges. Apart from generic aims such as fighting corruption and building an economy based on solidarity
and Islamic values, the programs did not include any
specific measures and instruments on how to attain
such goals.
The Islamist parties failed to benefit from several
meetings with the business community during the
electoral campaign to develop a strategic vision to
achieve economic growth. Their objective, then, was
primarily aimed at reassuring investors of their commitments to market economy and support for investments. For instance, the Ennahda leadership had meetings with different Tunisian business organizations in
the country. In November 2011, Ennahda organized
a conference on the tourism sector to discuss with
private sector investors ways and means to develop
the sector, but only limited practical steps have followed. The Islamist-led government plan, announced
by the Islamist Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane
in January 2012 at the Moroccan parliament, did not
include any details on how the government is aiming
to achieve macro-economic balances and create job
opportunities. The document did not include a single
detailed policy on how to reduce the budget deficit or
reform tax policy.38
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ISLAMIST FOREIGN POLICY:
A PRAGMATIC TRAJECTORY
The momentous change in the political landscape
of the three countries has not led to significant policy
change in their external relations. Foreign policy did
not feature as a priority policy area for the Islamist-led
governments, with their concern and discourse focusing instead on internal political and socio-economic
issues. During the electoral campaign, the discourses
focused mainly on themes and policies with broad appeal to masses—jobs, fighting corruption, and cronyism. References to foreign relation issues were brief
and aimed at signaling continuity to international investors and to governments of strategic importance.
There has been no document released that outlines the
key objectives of foreign policy, or the priorities for
today and the coming years.
Conversely, foreign observers have shown much
interest in the position of these much-feared political
players in international affairs. The arrival of Islamists
in power in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia raised questions about how the foreign policy of each country and
of the entire region would develop. For many observers, the immediate concern was relations with Israel
and the Western world. For instance, would Egypt
revoke its peace agreement with Israel? Would there
be a radical change of policy stance toward the IsraeliPalestinian conflict? Would security cooperation between the United States and its Arab Mediterranean
partners continue or experience difficulties? Would
changes of government imply a transfiguration of the
region’s strategic relations with emerging global powers? For a country like France, the dramatic changes
in the political landscape sowed doubts in politi-
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cians’ and strategists’ minds about the future of their
strategic presence in the North African countries.
Two years of Islamist rule in Morocco and Tunisia
brought no shift in the focus and interests of foreign
policy of either country. This continuity is attributed to
several key factors. First, the Islamist movements never had a grand strategy for foreign policy. Thus, their
arrival to power did not lead to any major changes in
their governments’ foreign policy stances and choices.
The pragmatism that has characterized Moroccan and
Tunisian diplomacy still dominates the thinking and
practice of the foreign policy cadres. Foreign policy
was mainly designed to protect national economic
and political interests, and not to follow any ideological value or rhetoric such as pan-Arabism or liberal
democracy. In the case of Morocco, core national political interests merely refer to preserving the national
unity and territorial integrity of the country vis-à-vis
Western Sahara and the Spanish enclaves in the North
of Morocco. The country’s leadership opted for a low
profile policy on regional and international political
affairs. The hegemonic aspirations of Morocco in the
Maghreb have been muted. The Moroccan leadership
refrains from openly playing a leading role in regional
affairs at this critical geostrategic juncture.
The stance of Tunisia regarding the French military
intervention in Mali is characteristic of the pragmatism
adopted by the Islamists in foreign policy. In January
2013 Tunisian Foreign Minister Rafik Abdessalem
voiced sympathy with the French intervention against
the terrorist groups in northern regions of Mali.39 This
showed that strategic relations with France outweigh
the idealistic perspectives of the political party.
Second, the change of the political landscape in Tunisia and Morocco did not result in a change of bureau-
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cracy. The technocrats and civil servants remained in
their positions. In Tunisia, diplomats were not at the
center of public scrutiny. The Foreign Affairs Ministry
was not strongly associated with the wrongdoings of
Ben Ali’s regime in the same way as the Ministry of
Interior. For most Tunisians, it was mainly city governors and senior members of the dominant ruling
party, CDR, that were seen as remnants of Ben Ali
loyalists. In Morocco, the foreign policy of the country is to a large extent a domain of the royal palace.
The newly-endorsed constitution of July 2011, which
primarily aimed to placate street protests, has brought
no change to the palace’s dominant role in driving
Morocco’s diplomatic relations. The appointment of
former Foreign minister Taib Fassi Fehri as the King’s
advisor, and Yousef Amrani as minister delegate at
the Foreign Ministry next to the Islamist Minister,
Saadeddin Othmani, was intended both to signal and
to assure the continuity of the palace’s dominance in
shaping the foreign policy of Morocco. This has been
clear to most of Morocco’s partners, and led to less
deep concern than in the cases of Tunisia or Egypt.
Third, Islamists have sensed that the imperatives
of social stability and economic growth would have to
drive foreign policy priorities. Relations with Western
governments are perceived as the route to a prosperous economy. Both countries are economically dependent on their relations with European countries.
France remains the largest trading partner of Tunisia
and Morocco. Tunisia’s new leaders capitalized on the
political change that is taking place in their country
to request from their European peers a reinforcement
of their partnership. In November 2012, Tunisia was
granted the status of “advanced partner,” which aims
to further reduce barriers to free movement of goods,
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services, and people.40 In Morocco, strengthening
strategic relations with the European continent featured in the discourse and initiatives of the PJD-led
government.
In Egypt, the election of Islamists inaugurated a
new era for the country’s external relations. Changes
have been few, but remarkable. The most important
ones are related to Egypt’s relations with Israel. The
two countries have enjoyed relatively stable security
relations since the signing of the peace treaty in 1979.
But the ousting of Mubarak’s government and Egypt’s
ongoing turbulent transition brought new challenges
for Israel. The concerns of Israeli policymakers about
the stability of their country’s relations with Egypt
were not misguided.41 There were moments of tensions between the two countries following the ousting of Mubarak and during the rule of the Supreme
Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), a military junta that
ruled Egypt from January 2011 until July 2012, and
the Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptian-Israeli “gas
trade diplomacy” was the first to suffer the repercussions of political change in Egypt. Recurring attacks
on the gas pipelines resulted in a prolonged disruption of gas supplies to Israel in 2011.42 The targeting
of this strategic infrastructure was not random. The
gas trade between the two countries has been a controversial issue since the signing of the agreement in
2005. Members of Egyptian civil society campaigned
for years to cancel the deal on a commercial basis.43
Under pressure of public opinion, the Egyptian authorities first announced their intention to review the
prices of their gas exported to Israel.44 In April 2012,
Egypt announced a unilateral termination of its gas
supply contract to Israel. Egyptian authorities asserted that the cancelation was due to domestic shortages
and not to political motives.
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Egypt recalled its Ambassador in Tel Aviv, Israel,
twice, once under the military rule, and the second
time at the decision of Morsi’s government to protest
Israeli strikes on the Gaza strip.45 It is important to
note that Egypt’s post-revolution rulers showed pragmatism in managing their delicate relations with Israel, far from any ideological or nationalist dogma. The
only factor that drove the Egyptian rulers was public
opinion, and both the military and the Muslim Brotherhood avoided being deemed complacent toward
Israel. Meanwhile, Egypt’s rulers have tried hard to
convey a message of continuity in their diplomatic relations with Israel, and that their commitment to honoring the Camp David Accords with Israel remains a
fundamental pillar of Egyptian foreign policy.
At the same time, precarious political and economic circumstances have forced Egypt’s leadership
to freeze their ambitions to play a leadership role in
the Middle East. For decades, Egypt was regarded as
the central regional power with its large army and dynamic diplomacy. But the mediation of Morsi in the
2012 Israel-Gaza conflict should be seen more as motivated by domestic Egyptian factors. An escalation
of the conflict on Egypt’s borders could have put the
Muslim Brotherhood in a difficult position, given the
long relations between the Brotherhood and Hamas
and delicate relations with Israel.46
The limited rapprochement with Iran remains the
most controversial foreign policy episode of President Morsi’s time in government. The exchange of
visits between the two heads of state provoked concerns among Egypt’s traditional strategic partners, the
United States, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, and Israel, about the future direction of Egypt’s
international relations agenda. Morsi’s initiative did
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more harm to the image of Egypt by confusing its
strategic neighbors. U.S. and GCC policymakers saw
in this rapprochement by one of their most important
security allies an attempt to undermine their efforts to
isolate Iran and pressure its political elites to reconsider their nuclear development plans. Distancing itself from Iran constituted an important element of the
previous government’s cooperation framework with
the GCC. Over the previous decade, GCC countries,
particularly Saudi Arabia, had established a doctrine
in their relations with Arab and Muslim countries visà-vis the Iranian threat that could be summarized as
“you are either with us or with the other.”
The exchange of visits between Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi was not regarded merely as a routine
protocol exercise. It was rather a continuation of years
of contacts and mutual admiration. The ties between
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Iran predate
the Arab Spring, despite their ideological differences.
In 2009, Mohammed Mahdi Akef, ex-Supreme Guide
of the Muslim Brotherhood, confirmed this contact
with the Iranians in an interview published on Aljazeera’s website, and explained the position of the
Muslim Brotherhood vis-à-vis the interaction with
Iran despite sectarian rivalry. As a Sunni organization, he asserted that the Muslim Brotherhood deals
with the Iranian state, and not with Shi’ism as sect.47
But most importantly, Muslim Brotherhood leaders
have seen in the Iranian Islamic government a practical embodiment of their political ideals to establish an
Islamic state.
Critical voices also emerged from within President
Morsi’s circle of collaborators. Fouad Jabblah, ex-legal
advisor to Morsi who resigned in 2013, warned the
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Islamist-led government in an interview published
in the pan-Arab newspaper, Asharq al-Awsat, of the
damage that the rapprochement with Iran is causing
to Egypt’s national interests, particularly with the Gulf
rulers.48 Iran is no replacement for GCC countries:
There is a limit of what Iran, with its own economic
difficulties, can offer to Egyptians. The GCC countries, in contrast, provide millions of employment opportunities to Egyptian families. Wealthy GCC countries provide economic assistance and are a source of
inward investment in the Egyptian economy.
This shift in Egypt’s foreign relations with its strategic partners might have cheered ordinary people,
but certainly did not enjoy the full backing of all Egyptian institutions. The Egyptian military, a key beneficiary of the peace agreement with Israel through U.S.
military aid, was alarmed about the degradation of
Egypt’s relations with Israel. They observed how anxious Israeli leaders were about the obscure direction
of Egyptian foreign policy interests and the country’s
stability. Deteriorating relations with Israel would
come at a high price. The U.S. aid has been tacitly part
of the Camp David peace package, aimed at strengthening the interest of Egypt in keeping the peace
agreement.
Military officers rarely make any public statements
on Egypt’s relation with Israel. But through recent decades, senior military officers have had good relations
with their counterparts in Israel. The quality of these
relations could be deduced from the positions adopted by Israeli diplomats and politicians, who lobbied
in Washington and across western capitals in favor
of military control of power in Egypt. After the ousting of Morsi in July 2012, Israel openly called on the
United States to maintain its aid package.49
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There has been a palpable sense of urgency among
policymakers to strengthen Arab regional cooperation
and integration. In North Africa, leaders confronted
with ongoing protests and acknowledging the common socio-economic challenges facing their countries
saw reactivation of an economic integration project
as a pertinent policy measure to reduce the risks of
instability. But so far, there has been limited success.
Politicians in transition countries naturally prioritize
political and security issues over strengthening regional integration. Furthermore, the same geopolitical
hurdles that impeded the Maghreb Arab Union project for decades remain unresolved. Animosity and
mistrust between Algeria and Morocco prevail. Land
borders have remained closed between the two countries since 1994, and recent attempts to negotiate a reopening have yielded no results.
Ironically, it is the opposite that is happening. The
fragile political and security situations in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt have had a negative impact on a range
of planned and existing economic integration projects.
Egyptian gas exports to Jordan and other neighboring
countries, for example, have suffered from disruptions
as a result of repeated bombings of Sinai pipelines.
Turkey has seen a window of opportunity opening with the Arab Spring revolution, to strengthen its
position in the Middle East. In line with its soft power strategy to win the hearts and minds of the Arab
people over the last decade, the Turkish leadership
has aligned with demands to establish democratic
regimes and respect human rights. Turkish Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan sided with protestors
and asked Mubarak to relinquish power.50 The AKP
political brand appeals to Islamist movements in the
region. The Turkish model was perceived a success-
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ful model of a modern and prosperous state run by
an Islamic government. The Turkish democratic experience is seen as the most relevant example to Arab
socio-cultural realities. The AKP’s skillful strategy to
contain the political and economic influence of secular
elites has been appreciated by Islamist governments
in the Arab world. Turkey is used as a case study because of spectacular economic performance since AKP
came to power.
To win strategic and long-term friendships in the
region, the Turkish leadership was proactive in providing Islamic political parties with logistical support
and strategic guidance. This element of AKP foreign
policy doctrine was spelled out by Kemal Dervis, Turkey’s ex-Minister of Economic Affairs, who noted that
“friendships in the new world are more important
than membership of various clubs- including the European Union.”51 Turkey’s interests are not solely ideological, but rather serve to achieve an economic foothold in these North African countries. The frequency
of visits is a strong indicator of the importance of the
relationship between Turkey and these countries. Istanbul and Ankara became important destinations for
Islamist political leaders mainly from Libya, Tunisia,
and Egypt. Erdogan, accompanied by Turkish industrialists and businessmen, has paid visits to all North
African countries with the aim of strengthening his
government’s and Turkey’s political and economic
ties with the region.52
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Since the fall of the regimes in Egypt and Tunisia
in January 2011, the political scene in the region has
seen major transformations; new political parties have
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been formed, several free and, by most accounts, reasonably fair elections have been organized, and a new
cadre of political parties—many of them with Islamic
voices—have acquired government positions in three
Arab countries. The victory of Islamists sparked fears
and uncertainty within the countries and beyond.
Domestically, secular and religious minorities have
been concerned about the future of their individual
rights and religious freedoms. At the regional level,
neighboring countries have feared that the rise of Islamist parties, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt, could be mirrored by similar transformation in
their own territories.
To various degrees this scenario remains of concern for the Arab world’s republics, most of which
already face an explicit or covert Islamic opposition;
as well as for its monarchies, particularly those of the
Gulf in which political parties so far do not yet exist,
and for whom transnational organizations such as the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood present a potentially
threatening scenario if transplanted into their own
national contexts. In the West, much of the worry is
focused on how Islamist domestic and foreign policies
are going to impact the geopolitics of the Middle East
and North Africa region and whether those potential
future Islamist-led governments will ever forge the
kind of political ties the long-held Mubarak and Ben
Ali regimes held with the West, despite their internally largely undemocratic natures.
However, it seems that these worries have not
translated into the worst case scenarios put forward
by those opposing the inclusion of Islamist parties in
Middle East politics a priori. In the case of Morocco
and Tunisia, Islamist leaders have displayed some
moderation and—seemingly—pragmatism in their
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domestic political and societal plans as well as in managing their governments’ external relations. Neither
in Morocco, nor in Tunisia, have Islamist parties so
far attempted, nor shown the institutional capacity, to
change fundamentally the way their national political systems are run—be this in a positive or negative
sense. The Islamist-led governments of both countries
have at best disappointed many of their voters’ expectations for real change. This may indeed be a lesson
with a value of its own, in a region where Islamist
electoral victories have often been accompanied by
huge positive or negative expectations.
In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood experience was
different. Decisively more deconstructive, the Muslim
Brotherhood’s rule was, in many ways, too short to
allow for any realistic long-term positive outcome, but
the damage it did to the “image” of Islamist rule both
in Egypt and the wider region is undeniably negative.
The multifaceted relationship between the Muslim
Brotherhood on the one hand, and its more Salafist coalition partners on the other, with various foreign governments and political orientations, including Iran,
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Hamas, and various Palestinian
factions, as well as the party’s troubled relationship
with its own domestic security forces and the military, imply that the problem in Egypt is significantly
more complex, and cannot be reduced only to the
“failure” of one particular political stream. Instead, it
is a telling episode about the difficulty of reconstructing and rebuilding political systems according to parameters which remain unclear—such as the role of
religion under constitutional law, and the intended
content of policymaking beyond vague ideas of “social justice” and the “fight against corruption and the
former regime.”
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Nevertheless, all three experiences have to various
degrees demonstrated that despite their apparent vast
popularity amongst the Arab street masses, the Arab
world’s Islamist parties have not been prepared to
govern. They lacked the structures and qualified human resources to handle affairs of state. It has been
easy for the Islamist leaders, while in opposition or
in exile, to criticize previous governments and the regimes behind them, highlighting their incompetence
or lack of integrity. Once in office, Islamist politicians
have themselves been confronted with the challenging reality of taking responsibility to manage the
nation’s affairs. All the Islamist governments in the
region have failed to handle political and economic
challenges. They have been unsuccessful in stabilizing the economy in countries affected by revolution or
tackling the unemployment issue. Almost 2 years after
the coming to power of the first Islamist government
in the region, no alternative economic policy initiative
has yet been put forward.
But despite these structural limitations and meager progress in reform, Islamists still retain substantial public support. Regardless that the reputation of
Islamists has suffered significant damage, particularly
in Egypt, as result of public disillusionment with limited reforms the chance of Islamists of winning new
elections remains high. This is especially the case if the
current coalition governments fail to work with their
partners or the opposition, a scenario that is likely to
happen given the ongoing political standoffs in Tunisia and Morocco. Currently, there is still a lack of
strong and credible political parties in the countries
that could provide an alternative cohesive plan that
wins the support of large number of voters.
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The problem remains not Islamic ideology and values per se, but the general lack of experience, and skill,
of these parties to translate these values into realistic,
sensible policies. Only the development of this capability could turn Islamist parties into the sort of force
at work politically in many European countries, for instance Christian Democrats and other parties, whose
aim is to translate economic and legal reform into social benefit based on traditional social and religious
values. In the absence of any such realization within
the Arab world’s Islamist parties, their role will likely
continue to be one of an opposition movement, with
no ideas of their own other than ideological ones, and
no realistic long-term role in rebuilding, rather than
deconstructing economies and political systems.
The difficult political situation that has characterized these three countries over recent years will
remain in place for a prolonged period. Significant
political reforms are not going to be easily implemented. The Islamist parties in Tunisia and Morocco still
have to face a lengthy confrontation with the cronies
and bureaucracy of Ben Ali and the Moroccan Palace.
Every reform initiative will have to navigate its way
through different stages of resistance from parliament,
bureaucracy, and the business community. In Egypt,
after the military ousting of elected president Morsi,
the country has entered a new phase in its political
transition that is going to be characterized by further
insecurity and political instability. The disagreement
between supporters of the deposed Muslim Brotherhood president and his opponents will not fade away
peacefully or soon. What is happening in Egypt is a
manifestation of an emerging political phenomenon
that is likely to characterize the wider Arab region,
whereby Arab societies are becoming more and more
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polarized between secularists and Islamists. This is already having a negative impact on the political stability and security of Arab countries as a whole.
One key lesson to draw from these years of political tumult is that building a stable democracy is an
evolutionary process and takes time. It is not an affair
of quick wins or a zero-sum game. It is a diligent exercise that requires inclusion, dialogue, compromise,
and a forward-looking mindset. Governing a transition without a compromise is counterintuitive and
makes it difficult for these countries to move forward.
Rebuilding a country, even holding elections in the absence of common social agreement over its format and
tools, will be difficult within an electoral process, with
or without Islamist forces. The enormously emotive
debate surrounding proposed constitutional changes
by Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood-led government after
the elections is an important illustrating point—such
constitutional issues should have been resolved long
before any elected government had taken up its role.
Lastly, any successful transition will require the
contribution of civil society and its role in keeping the
public expectations at reasonable levels. Dealing with
the wide socio-economic problems the Arab world
is facing is a task that has been beyond consecutive
established governments and the international community for many decades. The outbreak of political
unrest is merely the tip of the iceberg of long-held
frustration and aggression against any form of political regime. No new government, whether Islamist-led
or not, could be expected to rectify decades of problems within a year or two; meaning that one of the
most valuable assets these governments will need is
time and stability. It is difficult for the Islamists to
negotiate with their political adversaries while their
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positions are driven by idealistic political expectations; and it will be difficult for them to reform any
part of the political system, without knowledge, skill,
and realistic goals and tools in their hands.
Policy Implications.
•	U.S. policymakers should not follow the popular trend of reducing the delicate political transition underway in Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco to simple ideological differences between
Islamist parties and their secular opponents.
Instead, it is a reflection of an ongoing struggle
between traditional elites that have benefited
economically and politically from the political
system of previous decades, and the new political forces that seek gradual change toward
more transparency and accountability. In this
respect, the aims of Islamist aspirations are in
line with U.S. aspirations for the region.
•	Furthermore, the coming to power of moderate
Islamist governments in countries of the region
does not automatically imply a deterioration of
relations with the United States and its allies. In
the three examples under consideration, pragmatism in foreign policy has prevailed.
•	Meanwhile, for as long as Arab countries lack
stable governments and an inclusive political
environment that is based on compromise and
dialogue, the region remains susceptible to further instability. The inability of these governments to meet the expectations and demands
of their people is likely to lead to more popular protest and unrest. These countries’ fragile
socio-economic situations render them vulner-
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able to fluctuations in global economic growth
and changes in the prices of international commodities. Further upheaval should be expected
and prepared for.
•	It is therefore important for the U.S. Government to continue playing its important role in
stabilizing the region through the provision of
a range of financial, educational, military, and
diplomatic support. It is critical for the success
of the ongoing political transitions that there
should be more emphasis on enhancing the
capabilities of the current Arab governments,
officials, and institutions in various policy areas. At the same time, government officials and
institutions are not the only important actors
requiring support; there should be more engagement with political parties, civil society.
and the private sector. Building a new political system is essential, and this cannot be other
than a joint effort of all societal structures and
of individuals.
•	There remains a vital role for the U.S. military,
both in direct assistance and in training and
education for these countries’ armed forces.
Education in post-conflict state building, leveraging U.S. lessons from the last 2 decades
of conflicts and troubled transitions, should
be emphasized, as well as continuing essential
efforts toward security sector reform and providing best-practice guidance in civil-military
relations, regardless of who is leading the
government. Security and defense institutions
have proved to be less susceptible to Islamist
ideological influences. This will foster the creation of more stable societies in the target coun-
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tries during and after this process of political
change.
•	The United States and the international community should prioritize the promotion of comprehensive dialogue among all social groups and
communities in these societies characterized by
a multitude of ethnic, religious, and ideological groups. National dialogue is the most effective instrument to shorten transitions to new
political eras, and should be assisted wherever
possible.
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